Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1992

Albertsons, INC v. Board of Review of the
Industrial Commission : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
John S. Chindlund; Robert S. Wing; Roger J. McConkie; Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler; Attorneys for
Petitioner.
Winston M. Faux; Assistant Attorney General; Attorney for Board of Review; Gayle M. Fullerton.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Albertsons, INC v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission, No. 920530 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/3502

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

BRIEF

JTAH

X)Cl.!Ar.L,<T
CFU
50

DOCKET NO.

f^C^^O
/

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ALBERTSONS, INC., an Idaho
corporation

Case No. 920530-CA

Petitioner,

Priority No. 7

BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION,
Respondent.
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF THE
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE UTAH INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION,
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE DIVISION,
STATE OF UTAH

WINSTON M. FAUX
Assistant Attorney General
140 East 300 South
P.O. Box 11100
Salt Lake City, UT 84147
(801) 533-2510
Attorney for Board of Review

JOHN S. CHINDLUND
ROBERT G. WING
ROGER J. MCCONKIE
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
(801) 524-1000
Attorneys for Petitioner

Gayle M. Fullerton
7669 South Sunrise Place
West Jordan, UT 84084

FILED
F^R

5 1993

iLS

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ALBERTSONS, INC., an Idaho
corporation

Case No. 920530-CA

Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION,

Priority No. 7

Respondent.
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF THE
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE UTAH INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION,
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE DIVISION,
STATE OF UTAH

WINSTON M. FAUX
Assistant Attorney General
140 East 300 South
P.O. Box 11100
Salt Lake City, UT 84147
(801) 533-2510
Attorney for Board of Review
Gayle M. Fullerton
7669 South Sunrise Place
West Jordan, UT 84084

JOHN S. CHINDLUND
ROBERT G. WING
ROGER J. MCCONKIE
PRINCE, YEATES 8. GELDZAHLER
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
(801) 524-1000
Attorneys for Petitioner

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1

ARGUMENT

2
I. EVIDENCE OF CLAIMANT'S INSUBORDINATION
WAS NOT RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON
APPEAL AND SHOULD NOT BE DISREGARDED
BY THIS COURT
II. CLAIMANT'S ACTION WAS NOT AN ISOLATED
UNINTENTIONAL ACT AND CONSTITUTES
GROUND FOR IMMEDIATE DISCHARGE.
..
III. THE BOARD OF REVIEW'S FACTUAL FINDING
IS NOT RATIONALLY BASED UPON SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE

5
7

CONCLUSION
ADDENDUM

-i-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases

Page

James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799 (Utah App. 1987)

4

Kehl v. Board of Review, 700 P.2d 1129 (Utah 1985) . . . .

5

Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987)

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Contrary
Brief

e v i d e n c e ot

- .rst

Hie arquippn^s r a i M - i

Claimant " 1,1

t i m e on a p p e a l

~, ii:11 J. i" J t IVI I J /

Court, .

•• worker.-

Kevi-*

in

-*rfer of
. ,

- o r i t-ioner

s argumM

.w -\*~ R e s p o n d e n t ' s

•

and s h o u l d

( ,jl i d'(:,"ri«">»:

wa--; r a i s e d
in""

l

ru

no*

*.<.:.

jt

i*.< . o i e g ^

raised

let! 1 (

" * * •=> < ] a - nin t ' s t h r e a t s

i;tie h e ^ : - :

ihis
to

'i^orred

appeal

; n*. o o n s i a e i ^ c

*

h o u M not; d i s r e g a r d

'Raiding

for:

irio^bv

..

.

uv

i

to

IP Board -J
the

"l reid

in-*

v — ^
i- ' -o a..
act an

elated, unintentional

r^.qt-jtutes qro m d ,

rrr immedjdLe disehaige

s

is rep
destruction

• "-* Claimant's

<* tumpciy ^i^r.

t

nsi~^" ^ h ^ &r* *

of

. *

.

.
•

"Thi- • I-H t n d

intentional

I I h

(\hirt

m c i a e n t , such a single

i r only free
iniji imi

-efficient to demonstrate employee

.culpabil ir.y .
The Board of
based upon substantial

Review's factual finding ir* no*- ~ at 5 on a
IM

"MM

'I'IP Bear-

n:ted unreasonably and irrationally by unu

* Review

\

xi\c - *.*- ALJ

• "ie;

insistent and incredible testimony in light ot not
only Mr

Kills

unLndoLd

I orl MIUMM

I it a 1r o in light

overwhelming evidence to the eoiiticii'y pi. (.nided by I H
Scott biu.k,inu

if the
11 '
"
'
• M,

ni.1 "i i Claimant's own inconsistent statements.

For these reasons and those set loiii

- J I Petitioner,

this Court should reverse the unreasonable findings of the Board
of Review and deny the benefits sought by the Claimant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
EVIDENCE OF CLAIMANT'S INSUBORDINATION WAS NOT
RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL AND SHOULD
NOT BE DISREGARDED BY THIS COURT.
Evidence of Fullerton's insubordination, threats,
quarreling and disrespect to co-workers may in of itself be
sufficient evidence to warrant discharge.

Despite the

Respondent's assertion to the contrary, evidence of Fullerton's
insubordination, threats, quarreling and disrespect to
co-workers was raised and considered in the hearing before the
ALJ.

Testifying before the ALJ, Mr. Earl Ellis stated:
It was early morning, I was working
graveyard shift at the time. He walked in
to ask for a battery change, and I told him
I would be right there. I got up and wiped
my hands to walk out, by that time he'd
already pushed the other battery back in.
He had trouble putting the retaining plate
in and started beating on the machine. I
asked him to stop; he wouldn't stop. I told
him, I said, MYou break that cover, I'm
going to have to turn you in.M His response
was, "I don't give a shit, go ahead and turn
me in. It will be the last thing you ever
do."

R. 0032
The employer initially argued that Fullerton was
discharged for not following a reasonable policy, rule or
instruction from the employer.

Likewise, the Utah Department
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of Employment Security Division expressly stated that the
Claimant was discharged for disqualifying just cause.
Subparagraph 7 of the company policy sheet (identified as
Exhibit 4 in the hearing before the ALJ, and submitted into
evidence before the ALJ) R. 0008 lists "Quarreling or fighting
with other employees" as cause for immediate dismissal.

The

record reflects that evidence of such conduct was presented to
the ALJ.

Such evidence was expressly included in the ALJ's

Findings of Fact.

R. 0055-56.

The issue of quarreling, threats and insubordination
was also raised by Robert F. Watson, in his letter of appeal to
the Board of Review.

Mr. Watson stated "...the claimant also

threatened Mr. Ellis if he did turn him in, and proceeded to
strike the equipment again..." R. 0065

(A copy of the

Robert F. Watson letter is attached hereto.)

It is clear from

the record that the evidence of threats, vulgar language and
insubordination was also considered by the Board of Review.
(R. 0083 referencing Mr. Ellis1 testimony cited above.).

The

Respondent correctly asserts that matters raised for the first
time on appeal should not be considered by this Court on
appeal.

See, Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987).

However, this is not the first time that the issue of
insubordination, threats and quarreling have been raised in
this matter.

A matter is sufficiently raised that it may be

raised on appeal if that matter has been submitted to the trial
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court and the trial court has had an opportunity to make
findings of fact or law.

James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799 (Utah

App. 1987).
The Appellant's review of Utah case law holding that
appellate courts will not hear issues raised for the first time
on appeal reveals that no such cases have involved
administrative hearings such as the one at issue here held
before the Industrial Commission.

Such hearings are unique in

that they do not generally generate the type of pleadings
associated with regular trials. That is, there are generally
no trial briefs, jury instructions, motions in limine, or
similar pleading wherein issues may and should be raised.
Generally, the only way issues are raised in such
administrative hearings is if they are brought to the attention
of the ALJ during the hearing.

Such was the case in this

matter with regard to evidence of insubordination, threats and
quarreling, as is evidenced by the ALJ's findings of fact.

For

these reasons, the Court should not disregard the Petitioner's
argument regarding insubordination, threats and quarreling with
co-workers.
POINT II
CLAIMANT'S ACTION WAS NOT AN ISOLATED,
UNINTENTIONAL ACT AND CONSTITUTES GROUND FOR
IMMEDIATE DISCHARGE.
The record is replete with evidence of the Claimant's
intentional destruction of company property.

-4-

Petitioner's

brief identifies the fact that Fullerton was earlier suspended
for willful destruction of company property on January 31,
1990.

He was also suspended for unsafe operation of equipment

on April 19, 1989.

R. 0009. Even if this Court is only free to

consider the April 2, 1992 incident in a vacuum, any such
single violation of willful abusive conduct is sufficient to
demonstrate employee culpability.

See, Kehl v. Board of

Review, 700 P.2d 1129 (Utah 1985) discussed more fully in the
Petitioner's brief.

Additionally, company policy expressly

states that willful destruction of company property or
quarreling with co-employees constitute grounds for immediate
dismissal.
POINT III
THE BOARD OF REVIEW'S FACTUAL FINDING IS NOT
RATIONALLY BASED UPON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
Respondent defines the issue on appeal as whether
there is "substantial evidence in light of the whole record to
support the Board of Review's findings." However, the
Respondent incorrectly portrays the Petitioner's argument as
merely a weighing of "the relative credibility of the testimony
of Mr. Ellis and Mr. Fullerton."

The Board of Review and the

ALJ acted unreasonably and irrationally by unduly crediting
Mr. Fullerton's inconsistent and incredible testimony in light
of not only Mr. Ellis' unbiased testimony, but also in light of
the overwhelming evidence to the contrary provided by Darrell
Kidd, Albertson's warehouse operation's manager, Scott
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Bradshaw, the perishable superintendent of Albertson's, and
Mr. Fullerton's own inconsistent statements.
The ALJ places much emphasis upon the fact that
Mr. Ellis could not see the Claimant's feet for a brief moment,
when the Claimant claims to have been standing on the rollers
and slipped, accidentally hitting the equipment.

R. 0055.

While Mr. Ellis states that for a moment he could not see the
Claimant's feet.

R. 0051. Ellis also testified that he earlier

saw the Claimant standing on the rail, not the rollers, and
striking the equipment.

R. 0031. Not only does Mr. Ellis

contradict the Claimant's statement that he was on the rollers,
but Darrell Kidd, based upon his experience and Fullerton's
experience, likewise stated that he could not understand why
anyone would stand on the rollers to move the battery.

R. 0047.

Similarly, the Claimant stated that he could not wait
for help from Ellis to change the battery, because he had a
"quota to keep" so he tried to change it himself.

R. 0040.

Mr. Kidd testified that the perishable day shift forklift
operators do not have a quota

R. 0046

and that employees have

been instructed never to change the batteries by themselves.
R. 0046-47.
Despite Mr. Ellis' testimony that he watched the
Claimant beat on the equipment at a time the Claimant was not
standing on the rollers

R. 0032

the ALJ accepted the

Claimant's version that his feet accidentally slipped on the

-fi-

rollers.

The ALJ's conclusion is unreasonable and not based

upon substantial evidence when considered, not just against
Mr. Ellis' testimony but against Mr. Bradshaw's testimony and
against Mr. Fullerton's own contradictory statement.

The

Claimant had earlier stated that the equipment was damaged when
it had slipped out of his fingers.

R. 0037-38.

The Respondent

is incorrect in stating that "the record. . .reflects that the
critical elements of the Claimant's account have remained
constant."

When first questioned about the incident, by

Mr. Bradshaw, Ellis denied any involvement.

R. 0037.

Then,

after being told of Ellis' statement, the Claimant claims the
equipment was damaged because it had grease on it and slipped
out of his fingers.

R. 0037-38.

Lastly, the Respondent argues

that the equipment was damaged when he slipped and fell on the
rollers banging the equipment.

It was unreasonable for the ALJ

and for the Board of Review to accept such inconsistent
testimony in light of substantial evidence to the contrary.

CONCLUSION

The record reflects that evidence of the Claimant's
insubordination, threats and quarreling with co-workers has
been raised and considered from the beginning of this case and
should be considered by this Court in making its determination
of whether the Claimant was properly terminated for cause.
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Despite the Respondent's assertions to the contrary, the
Claimant's action was not an isolated, unintentional act and
thus, constitutes grounds for immediate discharge.

Even if the

incident is considered in a vacuum, such a single violation of
willful, abusive conduct is sufficient to demonstrate employee
culpability.
The Board of Review's findings are not supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record
before the Court.

It is not simply a matter of weighing the

testimony of Mr. Ellis and Mr. Fullerton.

The ALJ and the

Board of Review unreasonably failed to credit the testimony of
other disinterested witnesses and to take into account the
Claimant's own contradictory statements.

The Appellant's

evidence on the record clearly establishes the employee's
culpability, knowledge and control.

For these reasons, the

Court should reverse the unreasonable findings of the Board of
Review and deny the benefits sought by the Claimant.
DATED this

^

day of February, 1993.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

By y&tzyc^^^*^^—'
Roger'j. McConkie
Attorneys for Petitioner
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ADDENDUM

IX

ATTENDANCE, STATUS AND P*i:
1. Due to the perishable nature of many of the commodities, and in order to prevent spoilage and to meet delivery and
production schedules, all employees must/eport to work as scheduled.
2. When unable to report to work, call in sufficiently in advance of the shift to enable your supervisor to provide a
replacement Absence without advising your supervisor or manager will be considered as voluntary resignation.
3 Report to work on time. Record all time worked on your time card. Employee must review and agree to comply with
the Company's stated Time Clock Policy and Procedures.
4. It is your own responsibility to keep informed of when you will be expected to work. Work schedules will be posted
near the time clock.
5 Advise your immediate supervisor promptly oi any cnange in name, aooress, teiepnone numoer, marital status, or
number of dependents, so the Company and Internal Revenue records may be kept current.

X

CAUSES FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL:,,
The following acts will not be tolerated and will oe considered surncient cause Tor immediate discharge:
1. Drinking intoxicants, or the use or possession of any illegal stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic substance, on'
Company premises at any time, whether on or off shift, or reporting to work under the effect of intoxicants, or any1
Illegal stimulant, or hallucinogenic substance'
2. Excessive tardiness, or absence without proper reason or notice to management
3 Proven immoral or Illegal behavior on Company premises.
4. Any fraudulent act or statement directly related to Company business.^
5 Excessive wage attachments or harrassment of the Company by your unpaid creditors.
6. Unauthorized possession of or damage to Company funds, property, or merchandise/
7. Quarreling or fighting with other employees.
8. Mishandling of Company funds or property. Any employee willfully damaging Company property, or breaking and/or
removing from the Company~premises, any merchandise for the purpose of eating V pilferage, will be subject to
immediate termination. All merchandise leaving the warehouse or plant must be accompanied by an invoice.
9. Gambling on Company property.
10 Insubordination, falsifying records, disclosing confidential Information, or any other act constituting willful disregard
of the Company's best interest.

XI.

BONDING* All employees must be bonded The premium involved shall be paid by the Company. In the event the Company's regular bonding company refuses to give bond to any employee for any reason, then and in that event, the
employee will be subject to immediate termination.

XII.

CHAUFFEUR'S LICENSES: All driver-warehousemen will be required to have a valid Chauffeur's License In the states
where they are required and for the state where the plant or distribution center Is located, within fifteen (15) days after
they are employeed. After fifteen (15) days of employment, all driver-warehousemen must at all times have a valid
Chauffeur's License. The license must be carried with them at all times. No exceptions will be made.

XIII.

PASSENGERS No driver-warehouseman will allow anyone, other than employees of the employer who are on duty,
to ride on his truck. This will not prohibit the driver-warehouseman from picking up other drivers, helpers, or others in
wrecked or broken down motor equipment and transporting them to the first available point of communication, repair,'
lodging, or available medical attention.

XIV.

COMPANY IMAGE: All actions by employees reflect upon the image of Albertson's, Inc., and In your dealings with the
public, you should at all times conduct yourself in a manner that is beyond reproach. This includes being cautious of
your actions in public, your dress and personal appearance, driving habits, language, etc

I hereby certify that I have read and understand the above Distribution and Manufacturing policies; and that in connection with
the application for employment with, continued employment by, or advancement with Albertson's, Inc., I have been advised
through receipt of this form that:
1. An Investigative consumer report as to my character, general reputation, personal characteristics, and mode of
living may be made and,
2. I have the right to make a written request within a reasonable time for a complete and accurate disclosure of the.
nature and scope of the investigation requested.
I also acknowledge that any report or other information required by Federal or State law now or hereafter In affect, shall be
deemed received by me If addressed to me at my last known addressT

Signature

'

r

<

f

''

^>

Witness by Supervisor ^Sfi/I
It r P i (cD I
WitnessbvSupervisor
>!>?ft lirFifty

JO
J&?UA{
<y*JL,

Distribution Center or Plant.

Original - Personnel File

1st Copy - Employee

2nd Copy

P j n ^ i K i T

0
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Albertsons9
April 19, 1989

TO:

Gayle Fullerton
rton

FROM:

Kirk Hansen

SUBJECT:

SUSPENSION^ (UNSAFE OPERATION OF EQUIPMENT)

Tou are hereby placed on a disciplinary suspension without pay beginning
April 20, 1989. You are to report to work at your regularly scheduled
time April 25, 1989. This suspension is due to your unsafe operation of
equipment. Any further incidents of this nature will result in termination.

/

EXHIBITS

000009

UDGE

Okay.

ENDERSON

Yes.

UDGE

Okay,

And do we need to call Mr. Ellis?
He witnessed the final incident.
Thank you. Be right back.

(OFF RECORD)

Wefre back on record. No testimony was taken or given during the time
that we were off record. I left the rocm to get Mr. Ellis to testify.
Would you agree, sir, that that's what occurred?
5FENCER

Yes.

IUDGE

Blank you. Would you agree, Ms. Henderson?

•ENDERSON

Yes.

JUDGE

Thank you. Been called to testify, Mr. Ellis.
right hard to be sworn*

Would you raise your

QftlH ADMINISTERED. Mr. Ellis answered in the affirmative.
Thank you, sir. If youfd state your name and position with the company.
ELLIS

Earl Layne Ellis, Maintenance.

JUDGE

And the occpany for which you work is Albertsons.

ELLIS

Albertsons Distribution.

JUDGE

And hew long have you been with them?

ELLIS

Three (3) years.

JUDGE

And in your capacity did you work with Mr. Fullerton?

ELLIS

As changing batteries for him, yes, I did.

JUDGE

Okay. And is there something that you observed, then, with respect to a
forklift in April?

EEilS

A reach (?) truck, yes.

JUDGE

A what kind of truck?

ELLIS

Reach truck.

JUDGE

Reach truck.

Okay. When did this occur?

000021

ELLIS

It was early morning, I was working graveyard shift at the time. He
walked in to ask for a battery change, and I told him Ifd be right
there. I got up and wiped my hards to walk out, by that time hefd
already pushed the other battery back in. He had trouble putting the
retaining plate in and started beating on the machine. I asked him to
stop; he wouldnft stop. I told him, I said, "you break that cover, Ifm
gonna have to turn you inH. His response then was, lfI donft give a
shit, go ahead and turn me in. It'll be the last thing you ever do,f.

JUDGE

And what happened?

ELLIS

He beat on it a couple more times then—then left.

JUDGE

Did it break?

ELLIS

Yes, it did.

JUDGE

Okay. Then vfaat did you do?

ELLIS

As soon as my supervisor came in, I reported the incident.

JUDGE

Okay, thank you. Ms. Henderson.

HENDERSON

Yes. You testified that Mr. Fullerton came and asked you to help him
replace the battery. How long was it from the time he asked you to help
him replace the battery until the time you witnessed him banging the
battery on the plate?

ELLIS

Certainly less than a minute.

HENDERSON

Less than a minute?

ELLIS

Uh-hnm.

HENDERSON

And is it your job duty to help assist with —

FT I T S

To assist fem, right.

HENDERSON

Okay. Wbuld it be normal—would it be protocol for the claimant to try
and change the battery by himself?

FTI.TS

it happens; yes, mafam.

HENDERSON

Okay. Did you see where the claimant was standing, the claimant being
Mr. Fullerton, where he was standing at the time?

FT I T S

He was standing on the rack.

HENDERSON

Can you describe what the rack is?
10
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UDGE

Oh, okay. Be right back.

(OFF RECORD)

We're back on record. No testimony was taken or given during the time
that we were off record. I simply went and got Mr. Bradshaw. Would you
agree, Mr. Spencer?
IPENCER

Yes.

UDGE

Thank y o u .

HENDERSON

Yes.

JUDGE

Thank you. Youfve been called to testify, sir.
right hand?

Would y o u a g r e e , Ms. Henderson?

Would you raise your

OATH ADMINISTERED. Mr. Bradshaw answered in the affirmative.
Thank you, sir. If you f d state your name and position?
BRADSHAW

Scott Bradshaw, Perishable Superintendent of Albertsons.

JUDGE

Okay; and as such, were the direct supervisor of Mr. Fullerton?

BRADSHAW

Yes.

JUDGE

And hew long have you been his direct supervisor?

BRADSHAW

A couple years, new.

JUDGE

Okay. And did you interview him with respect to what occurred with the
forklift?

BRADSHAW

Yes.

JUDGE

Okay.
him?

BRADSHAW

The date, I don't have exactly.

JUDGE

Okay.

BRADSHAW

I called him in after LaVell James had approached me and told me what
Earl had told him. And that's when I called Mr. Fullerton in, and we
*-J»IVPH about it; and it started out where he denied anything, as far as
involvement with the battery, or the lid, or \Aiatever. And we proceeded
to tell him about what was said, and vtot we've heard, and what Earl and
LaVell had told me. Later he said it was an accident, and that it w a s —

And tell me when the incident occurred and when you talked to
It's written on the letters.

15
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had grease on it and it slipped out of his fillers.
basically, I donft knew (pause) —

And that was,

JUDGE

Okay. Anything else you said to him?

BRADSHAW

No.

JUDGE

Okay, thank you. Go ahead, Ms. Henderson?

HENDERSON

You testified the conversation that you had, at any tine did
Mr. Fullerton make the excuse that he was standing on same rollers and
had slipped?

BRADSHAW

None.

HENDERSON

Okay. And you said that at first he denied anything to do with the
battery, is that all he said or can you expand on vfoat he said?

BRADSHAW

(Unintelligible), I danft; but he just acted like he didn't know nothing
about it at first; and then as we got into talking and explaining that—
that Earl seen him do this and LaVell told ine this, and thatfs when he
said it was an accident.

HENDERSON

Okay.

BRADSHAW

No.

HENDERSON

Okay. And—and who was that decision made by, in part?

BRADSHAW

Through Darrel, and I'm sure he had a conference with Boise.

HENDERSON

Okay.

JUDGE

Thank you. Any questions you have, sir?

SPENCER

Scott, during your interview with Mr. Fullerton, I guess during your
investigative portion of this incident, did Gayle at any time state that
the battery cover was already broken?

BRADSHAW

(Pause) Uh, no.

SPENCER

And you already testified that he said he—he didn't say anything about
standing on the rollers and sliding, or slipping, or—or anything of
that nature?

BRADSHAW

No, nothing; no.

SPENCER

lhatfs all I have, Your Honor.

New, did you make the decision to discharge the claimant?

No further questions.

16
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UDGE

Okay. I assume that that has to do with the damaged forklift or reach
truck, is that correct?

1AIMANT

Yes.

UDGE

All right. When—when did this occur; do you remember the date?

IAIMANT

(No audible response)

UDGE

Calendar help you at all?

IAIMANT

(long pause)

RJDGE

If you don't, thatfs okay.

IAIMANT

It's—it's the date that was stated en the report, I believe.

JUDGE

About April 2nd?

3AIMANT

Yeah.

JUDGE

Okay. What happened?

CLAIMANT

I went in to get a battery change and it was, I believe, afternoon not
morning. And I went in to ask Earl to ocme and help me. And I went out
and I waited. It wasn't one minute; it was at least five (5) minutes.
And I have a quota to keep; so I just took it upon myself to change the
battery.
I kicked the battery out. I—I switched batteries, and I
pushed the fresh battery back in; and the batteries sit on rollers. And
there's no way you can push 'em in without standing on those rollers.
There's just no other way to do it. And usually you use the rollers as
a brace to—to get enough force behind the battery, because they are so
big and heavy, to push it in. And a lot of times, you knew, you—you
need help to do that. But I've had a lot of experience at it; so I got
the battery back in and by this time Earl had cone out. And, to me, he
seemed like he was in a bad mood because I believe they had just got a
butt chewing from—because they weren't keeping the machines in good
operating order. 'Cause we were always having lifts break down and it
was holding us up on our production. So he, to me, seemed to be in a
bad way.

JUDGE

What made you think that?

ClAIMANT

Because he had an attitude of just, uh, short-tenpered.

JUDGE

Anything he did or said that made you think that?

CLAIMANT

Uh, I can't remember exactly. Just I had that iirpression. That was the
impression I had, but I don't exactly remember v*iat was said.

I just —
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JUDGE

Thanks. Go ahead, sir.

KIDD

No, I would not have—I would not have changed the decision that'd been
made based on what (unintelligible).

JUDGE

And why not?

KIDD

I do not believe that Earl has any rootivaticn to fabricate a story
stating that Gayle was pounding, repeatedly, on the piece of equipment.
He certainly has nothing to gain by that.
And as you have heard,
neither one of the employees has had any previous problems with each
other. There's no personal vendetta, and certain cannot fathom anything
to substantiate Earl fabricating such a story.
He was there; he
witnessed Gayle hitting the machine repeatedly and witnessed the damage,
immediately following that. And had reported it, as he said, to his
immediate supervisor as soon as he came in.

JUDGE

Okay. Any other questions you have of him?

HENDERSON

Yes. While the two warnings that happened sometime earlier did not play
a crucial role in your decision, did you feel that—that the claimant
had demonstrated this type of behavior in the past and that may have
COTitributed to the decision?

KIDD

Yes.

HENDERSON

Okay.
The claimant testified that he had waited more than five (5)
minutes, we have a few minutes time discrepancy, but that he was—he had
a quota that he needed to meet. Does—does Mr. Fullerton have a quota?

KIDD

The perishable day shift for our forklift operators do not have a quota.
They are required to put away as much product as they possibly can
throughout their shift. They are monitored by the supervision of their
immediate foreman and supervisor, and we do not actually track pallets
per hour or discipline them for, for exairple, not putting away enou^i
product; and there has not been one incident in the past, to my
knowledge, where an employee was reprimanded for taking too long to
change a battery.

HENDERSON

Okay. Mr. Bradshaw testified that in the meeting Mr. Fullerton did not
provide the excuse that he had slipped on rollers; but had he provided
that excuse, Mr. Ellis testified that he did not see Mr. Fullerton on
the rollers.
The claimant testified that he had to stand on the
rollers, there was no way to change the battery without standing on the
rollers. Do you have any knowledge on changing a battery? (Telephone
ringing)

KIDD

Yes, I'm familiar with the way the batteries are changed. Employees in
the past have been instructed never to change the batteries by

Yes; indeed, it did.
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themselves; we danft believe itfs safe.
And, personally, I cannot
understand why a person having as much knowledge about changing these
batteries as Gayle would, since he's been operating that type of
equipment for approximately eight (8) years, why he would even stand on
the roller to begin with. Of course, I didn't witness the incident. I
can't say that he was not standing on the roller. Had that been the
cause of him slipping and falling, I—I also can't imagine why he would
not bring that up at the time he was being terminated.
ENDERSON

But if—in response to his claim that there's no other way to pushing a
battery without standing on the rollers, you would have to rebut that,
according to what you've just said?

KIDD

That is—Absolutely.

JUDGE

Let's not put words in his mouth, okay.

HENDERSON

Would you have to say that that's not accurate?

KIDD

That's—that is not accurate. It's—it is not necessary to stand on the
rollers to change the battery, to take it in—to put it in or take it
cut.

HENDERSON

Okay.

JUDGE

Thank you. Any questions you have?

SPENCER

While it's not necessary to stand on the rollers to change the battery,
would it be more convenient, would it be conducive for an enplqyee to do
so even though that it might be against the rules?

KIDD

I can't understand why. Pushing a 1500-pound battery, I cannot imagine
why anyone would want to stand on rollers that were designed to move a
1500-pound weight freely.

SPENCER

And you stated that there—there was not a quota for—for the pallet
track (?) operators as to hew many pallets a day that they put away.
Isn't it Albertsons' policy to extract or get the production of their
employees at a high level and by doing so, that they, while maybe not
setting a quota, they do have a standard or a expected goal?

KIDD

The amount of product that a forklift operator puts away is not
individually tracked. Scott Bradshaw does monitor the toted amount of
pallets put away by all the forklift operators in one shift; and that is
for his—used by him as a tool to know hew productive the shift is, as a
whole, in putting product away.
Of course, that verifies for—for
many—for various reasons. Seme equipment may break dewn, people may
not be there, they may be extremely busy and congested. The—I sinply
was trying to make a point that as far as a quota, or a minimum

No further questions.
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ELLIS

Right, when I offered to hold it in after he'd been striking it. He
didnft put the plate in, continued to beat on it. I walked to the back
of it 'cause I didn't want to get hit in the face with anything.

JUDGE

Okay. So in the beginning, then, you were at the opposite side of the
forklift.

ELLIS

As I was walking out, like I stated, he was hitting it.

JUDGE

Okay.
Yeah, what—Okay, when you first came in, then you came in,
probably, where your finger is, we'll put that north.

ELLIS

Right.

JUDGE

Okay. So you were at the north there, and then he was at the west.

ELLIS

Uh-hrtro.

JUDGE

Then you moved from the north, then, over to the east; and between you,
then, was the forklift, is that correct?

ELLIS

Ricpit; uh-hnm.

JUDGE

Okay. When you got over here, \Aiat was occurring?

ELLIS

He was—wouldn't put the plate in. Was hitting it again.

JUDGE

Okay. And how could you see him?

ELLIS

I couldn't see his feet at that particular minute.

JUDGE

Okay.

FT I T S

But, like I said, in walking frcm the backside to the—from the north
side to the east side, —

JUDGE

North to east, okay.

FTi.Tfi

I'd seen him striking it, standing on the rail, already, from the north
side. And then when he wouldn't put the plate in, I walked back to the
north side so that I wouldn't get hit with anything.

JUDGE

Okay. Then anything else ycu have of him, sir?

SPENCER

No.

JUDGE

Okay.

You, Ms. Henderson?
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Gayle M. Fullerton

FINDINGS GP FACT:
Prior to filing for unemployment benefits effective April 5, 1992, the claimant
earned $11.10 per hour working full-time as a forklift operator for Albertsons
where he was employed fron April 5, 1981 to April 3, 1992. The claimant was
discharged from this enplqyer for the reasons set forth as follows.
The ocnpany policy allows for the immediate dismissal of an employee who
willfully damages ccupany property. The claimant was aware of the policy.
The union contract Albertsons has with Teamsters Local #222 provides that warning
notices an employee may receive will not remain in effect for more than one year.
The claimant received two warning notices. One was in April 1989 for operating
equipment in an unsafe manner. The second was in January 1990 for willful
destruction of oonpany property. Prior to April 1989, the claimant had received
no prior reprimands. On approximately April 19, 1989, the claimant had just
finished putting a pallet on a crown vihen another driver drove up beside him and
put a pallet beside his. This driver asked the claimant about a business matter.
In the course of the conversation, the claimant forgot he had not lowered the
forks. When he drove away and turned the corner, the forks caught on an object
which resulted in the forklift tipping over.
The claimant was placed on
suspension without pay from April 20, 1989 to April 25, 1989. On January 31,
1990, the crew was leaving early. It was Superbowl Sunday. The door to the time
clock was locked. The claimant and two others began "goofing around" by banging
on the door. The claimant kicked the door. He hit it harder than he expected.
A board by the doorknob cracked. The claimant estimated the cost of repair to be
$5.00.
The door did not open. The claimant received two weeks suspension
without pay for the infraction.
On April 2, 1992, the claimant needed to change his lift trucks battery. The
claimant was a long term employee and had experience performing this task. The
batteries weighed fifteen hundred to eighteen hundred pounds. The batteries are
on rollers so they can be pushed out of the truck onto a truck like rack system
with rollers. In turn, the new battery moves off onto the truck on rollers. A
heavy metal plate holds the battery in place. The process takes two people.
The claimant drove his reach truck along side of the battery rack. He asked the
maintenance person for a battery change.
While he was waiting for the
maintenance man, he removed the old battery. He had pushed the new battery into
the truck but was having difficulty securing it with the metal plate. The
maintenance man was on the opposite side of the truck. In this position, the
maintenance man could not see the claimant's feet. The claimant slipped. When
he tried to regain his balance, the metal plate he had in his hand hit the lift
and chipped it. The maintenance man believed the claimant purposefully broke the
battery cover. The maintenance man told the claimant if he did that again he
would turn him in. The claimant responded to go ahead and turn him in and that
it would be the last thing he did. The claimant thought the maintenance man was
joking. Both perceived the other to be in a bad mood that day.
The maintenance man did report the claimant to his supervisor.
wrote:

In addition, he
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Gayle M. Rillerton

(*i april 2, 1992 at the approximate time of 5:30 a.m. Gail
(sic) Fullerton asked for a battery. When I got out there he
had pushed his old battery out and his new one in and had
difficulty putting in the retaining plate for the battery and
started hitting the top plastic cover repeatedly, when I told
him to stop or I would turn him in he hit it one more time
and told me to go ahead he didn't give a shit. Then he told
me if I did Ifd regret it.
Earl L. Ellis
4-2-92
Based on the maintenance persons account of what occurred, coupled with the past
reprimands, the company decided the claimant willfully broke the plastic battery
cover and discharged him. The claimant did tell the catpany the damage was not
intentionally.
KEASCtONS AMO 0CNOUU5ICN OF IAW:
The company did consider the past reprimands when deciding to discharge the
claimant. The 1989 and 1990 incidents were given no weicfrit with respect to this
decision. The company violated its union agreement by adding these reprimands to
their decision to dismiss the claimant. Both incidents occurred over two years
ago, well outside the time limitation, as per the union contract, for
consideration. Moreover, the 1989 occurrence was a one time isolated instance
due to inadvertence when the claimant became distracted. The 1990 mishap was the
result of horseplay. While the kicking of the door is not cordoned, it was not
meant to be destructive.
The claimant and the maintenance man have some crucial differences in their
testimony with respect to the April 2, 1992 battery change. The maintenance man
testified the claimant beat the plastic battery cover repeatedly. He did not say
the claimant broke it, however. The claimant stated he did not break this cover
nor did he hit it. He contends it was broken before he went to the battery area.
The claimant asserts he lost his balance v*iile changing the battery and, in this
process, the metal plate he was holding in his hand inadvertently hit the fork
lift. Inportantly, the maintenance man could not view the claimant's feet during
the entire process. While their testimony is different, the claimant seems more
credible to the Administrative Law Judge. Even if the credibility issue is net
considered, the weight of the evidence in a discharge case rests with the
enplqyer. If the weight is equal, the scales tip to the claimant in a discharge
case.
Section 35-4-5 (b) (1) of the Utah Employment Security Act provides that a
claimant for unemployment insurance benefits is not eligible if he or she was
discharged from employment for just cause or an act or omission in connection
with the enplcyment which was deliberate, willful or wanton and adverse to the
enplqyerfs rightful interests. In order to support a denial of unemployment
insurance benefits, an employer most establish by a preponderance of the
evidence the claimant was at fault in causing his or her cwn unemployment. That
is, the claimant must be shown to have had a substantial degree of control,
knowledge and culpability in the cxaxtuct resulting in discharge.
Thus, a
claimant will not generally be denied unemployment benefits where discharged for
mere inability, inefficiency, inadvertence or isolated incidents of good faith
error in jirigment or ordinary negligence.
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Gayle M. Pullerton

The employer did not establish by the preponderance of the evidence that the
claimant's actions rose to the level of culpability# knowledge and control to
impose a disqualification. The claimant's testimony is accepted that the damage
done on April 2, 1992 was accidental.
It is held he was discharged at the
convenience of the employer but not for disqualifying just cause. Benefits are
awarded.
A contributing eatplqyer may be relieved of charges if an individual is separate
for reasons which are disqualifying.
Since the claimant was separated for
reasons vftiich are not disqualifying, the enployer is not relieved of charges, far
the claim.
DBCTSICN:
The decision of the adjudicator denying benefits pursuant to Section 35-4-5 (b) (1)
of the Utah Btplqyment Security Act is reversed. Benefits are allowed effective
April 5, 1992 and continuing provided the claimant is otherwise eligible.
Albertsons is not relieved of charges for Gayle M. Fullerton pursuant to Section
35-4-7 (c) 3(C) of the Act.

La Vone lAddle^S&ironal
^ ^ ^
Administrative Law Judge
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY
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EIBBENS
TOMPANH
fid Box 57832
Salt lake City, Utah 84157
Telephone (801) 261-0071
Fax (801) 261-0110

J u l y 20, 1992

Board of Review
Industrial Commission of Utah
Department of Employment Security
P. 0. Box 11600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Re:

Gayle M. Fullerton
SS# 528-11-6899
Case No. 92-BR-241

Dear Board Members:
The Gibbens Company, on behalf of the employer, Albertson's Inc.,
requests a thorough review of the decision of the Administrative
Law Judge, dated June 3, 1992, that reversed a previous decision
of the adjudicator dated April 5, 1992.
In the hearing, Mr. Earl Layne Ellis, maintenance for Albertson's,
testified that the claimant struck company property several times
in order to attempt to replace a retaining plate for a replaced
battery (Trans, pg. 10, para. 1). In the process of beating on
this equipment, damage occurred in the amount of $169.48 (employer's
exhibit #7). When the claimant was told to stop beating on the
equipment by Mr. Ellis, the claimant struck the equipment again.
The employer has a policy that establishes willful damage to
company property is grounds for immediate termination. The
claimant was aware of this policy and had signed this document
(employer exhibit #4). The claimant has had a history of behavior
regarding damage to company propert (ALJ decision pg. 3)
(Trans, pg. 6).
The claimant testified he damaged the company's property by
accident (Trans, pg. 30). Mr. Ellis testified that not only had
the claimant struck the equipment several times after Mr. Ellis
threatened to report the claimant if he didn't stop beating on
the equipment, the claimant also threatened Mr. Ellis if he did
turn him in, and proceeded to strike the equipment again
(Trans, pg. 10).
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If the claimant had slipped and struck the equipment by
accident, as he claims, there would be no reason to strike the
equipment again unless it was intentional. At no time did the
claimant provide the excuse that hitting the equipment was an
accident (Trans, pg. 1).
Mr. Darrell Kidd, Warehouse Operations Manager, testified to
the character and voracity of Mr. Ellis (Trans, pg. 23). The
claimant's voracity has been in question since the final incident occurred. When questioned by Mr. Scott Bradshaw, Perishable
Superintendent, the claimant denied his involvement in this
incident until pressed with information that had been provided
from Mr. Ellis and Mr. LaVell James (Trans, pg. 15).
In conclusion, previous warnings are not required in order to
discharge an employee who willfully damages company property.
The claimant has had a history of suspensions for such conduct
during the past few years. The claimant knew his job would be
in jeopardy for committing such actions by virtue of previous
suspensions and a signed document.
The claimant was asked by maintenance personnel to stop striking
company equipment. The claimant threatened the maintenance
personnel and proceeded to strike the equipment again. When
questioned by management about the incident, he first denied that
the incident had occurred. When faced with the vane of his
accusers, the claimant changed his story and stated that it was
an accident. At the hearing the claimant further changed his
story and stated that he had slipped, a detail previously not
mentioned. Mr. Ellis's story has remained the same throughout
this entire process.
As such, it is the employer's position that a reasonable review
of the facts should prevail to establish that the claimant committed an act of wanton, willful disregard to the employer's
rightful interest, and that the claimant had, or should have
known that his actions would or could result in his termination.
Further, it certainly was within the claimant's control to stop
striking the company's equipment after being told by maintenance
personnel to do so.
And finally, the employer has suffered a substantial loss due
to the damage caused by the claimant's lack of patience or
concern.
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The employer respectfully requests that the initial decision
to not allow benefits, be reinstated, and that the employer's
benefits ratio account be relieved of all charges in this
matter.
Sincerely,

Robert F. Watson
Sr. Account Executive
RFW:dd
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BOARD OF REVIEW
The Industrial Ocnmission of Utah
Unemployment Compensation Appeals
GAYIEM. lUUERTON
S.S.A. NO. 528-11-6899

DEPAKMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY

£MyiI/ERr/cd

:
:

Case No. 92-A-3239

:

EEOSICN

:

Case Nb. 92-ER-241

:

The employer, Albertsans, Inc., appeals the decision of the
Administrative lav judge in the above-entitled matter which held that the
claimant, Gayle M. Fullertan, had been discharged fran his employment with
the employer for reasons that are not disqualifying under Section
35-4-5 (b)(1) of the Utah Enplqyment Security Act. The ALT's decision,
therefore, allowed payment of unemployment benefits to the claimant effective
April 5, 1992, and continuing, provided he is otherwise eligible. The AL7 f s
decision also held the employer liable for benefit charges pursuant to
Section 35-4-7 (c) of the Act.
After careful consideration of the record in this matter, the
Board of Review finds the decision of the Administrative Lav Judge to be a
correct application of the provisions of the Utah Employment Security Act,
supported by competent evidence and, therefore, affirms the decision. In so
holding, the Board of Review adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of
lav of the Administrative lav Judge.
The employer argues on appeal that the A U erred in finding the
claimant slipped and broke the battery plate accidentally. The enployer
further argues that a thorough review of the record reveals that the
employer's witness, Mr. Ellis, was more credible than the claimant.
In affirming the decision of the Administrative lav Judge, the
Board of Review notes that the employer is correct in its argument that this
case hinges on balancing the respective credibility of Mr. Ellis and the
claimant. The A U , who had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of both
witnesses, made a specific finding that the claimant "seems more credible to
the Administrative Law Judge." The Board of Review only reviews written
transcripts and documents associated with the Admixvistrative law Jtrige
hiring and does4 not have the opportunity to observe witnesses. The Board
must, therefore, rely on the ijipressions of the ALT on matters of credibility
derived fran observing the demeanor, of the witnesses.
Since the
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Administrative Law Judge found the claimant to be more believable than the
employer witness and since the A U ' s finding of fact that the claimant
accidentally slipped and inadvertently broke the battery plate is supported
by substantial competent evidence in the record, the Board affirms that
finding and affirms the Administrative Law Judge's decision that the employer
did not have just cause within the meaning of the Utah Employment Security
Act for discharging the claimant.
This decision becomes final on the date it is mailed, and any
further appeal must be made within 30 days from the date of mailing. Your
appeal must be submitted in writing to the Utah Court of Appeals, Midtown
Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. To file an
appeal with the Court of Appeals, you must submit to the Clerk of the Court a
Petition for Writ of Review setting forth the reasons for appeal, pursuant to
Section 63-46b-16 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and Rule 14 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, followed by a Docketing Statement and
a Legal Brief as required by Rules 9 and 24-27, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
/s/ Stephen M. Radley
/s/ Thomas L. Lewis
Although the Administrative Law Judge made a specific finding
regarding the respective credibility of the claimant and Mr. Ellis, my
reading of the record persuades me that Mr. Ellis' version of the incident
leading to the claimant's discharge is more trustworthy than the claimant's
and I would overrule the A U ' s finding that the claimant was more
credible than Mr. Ellis.
Mr. Ellis had no apparent advantage to be gained by saying the
claimant repeatedly and willfully beat on the battery plate. The claimant in
fact testified that he and Mr. Ellis got along well and no motive is
suggested in the record why Mr. Ellis would lie. When asked if he could
have been mistaken about what he saw, Mr. Ellis was steadfast in repeating
that the claimant was beating on the plate in frustration, not just trying to
regain his balance after a fall. The claimant on the other hand, when
accused of beating on the employer's property, had everything to gain by
claiming he slipped and accidentally damaged the battery plate. The
claimant's account is further thrown into question because of his claim tore
years **r1 i*r that he accidentally slipped and broke a door jam when he was
kicking at a door while horsing around. I find the claimant's repeated
excuse of "slipping" when others reported more willful behavior to be
suspicious.
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Mr. Ellis1 version of the event leading to the claimant1*
discharge has not varied fran the time he first reported it. He has asserted
fran the beginning that he saw the claimant beat numerous tl11*^ in
frustration on the battery plate. The ALT minimized Mr. Ellis1 observation
by making a finding that Mr. Ellis was unable to see the claimant's feet and
so could not see if the claimant was falling.
Mr. Ellis' testimony,
however, was that though he momentarily could not see the claimant's feet,
the claimant was not falling, but was clearly beating on the battery plate
in anger evidenced by the fact that the claimant struck the battery plate
again and threatened Mr. Ellis after he told him to stop.
The claimant admitted he hit the battery plate at least twice*
Ihis version seems inherently inconsistent to me as to hit the plate twice
would have meant he slipped and fell twice upon the battery plate. Biis is
not the claimant's testimony. He testified rather that he slipped onoe, then
stood up, and hit the plate with his hand. This story does not ring true to
me and is not at all consistent with the observations of Mr. Ellis. For
these reasons, I would overrule the Administrative Law Judge's finding of
fact that the employer's property was damaged accidentally by the claimant.
Furthermore, I disagree with the Administrative law judge's
conclusions about the inappropriateness of the employer referencing past
infractions of the claimant in arriving at its conclusion to discharge the
claimant. Ihe union contract provided that enplqyee warning notices will not
remain in effect for more than one year. The infraction for which the
claimant was discharged, willful destruction of ocnpany property, was grounds
for immediate dismissal under the employer's rules. Ihere was no need on the
part of the employer to go through any step-by-step disciplinary procedure in
the face of the claimant's actions and they did not do so. Referencing his
past behavior of kicking in a door was not necessary to sustain a discharge
but only adds strength to the employer's argument that this was an employee
who exercised marginal control over his tenper and who the enployer might
reasonably expect to see repeat destructive behavior. By referencing the
claimant's past behavior the employer established both the elements of
knowledge and harm as required to make a finding of just cause under the Utah
Employment Security Act. For these reasons, I dissent from the majority
opinion arri would reverse the decision of the Administrative Law judge that
the claimant was not discharged for just cause and that the employer is
chargeable for benefits paid in connection with this claim.
/s/ Lawrence Disera

Dated this 27th day of July, 1992.
Date Hailed:

July 30, 1992.

Utah Court of Appeal

FEB 5 1993
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS AT IS
The stautes and rules which are determinative iaferic^j)j&!1a"
matter are set forth verbatim in Appendix A/ and include the
following:
Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended)
Sections 35-4-5(b)(1), 63-46b-16 and
78-2a-3(2)(a).
Utah Administrative Code (1992)
R562-5b-102 and R562-5b-108.4.
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule
14.

35*4-5

Ineligibility for Benefits.

An individual is ineligible for benefits or for purposes of establishing a
waiting period:

Quit.
(a) For the week in which the claimant left work voluntarily without
good cause, if so found by the commission, and for each week thereafter
until the claimant has performed services in bona fide covered employment
and earned wages for those services equal to at least six times the claimant's
weekly benefit amount. A claimant shall not be denied eligibility for benefits
if the claimant leaves work under circumstances of such a nature that it
would be contrary to equity and good conscience to impose a disqualification.
The commission shall, in cooperation with the employer, consider for
the purposes of this chapter the reasonableness of the claimant's actions,
and the extent to which the actions evidence a genuine continuing
attachment to the labor market in reaching a determination of whether the
ineligibility of a claimant is contrary to equity and good conscience.

Quit to Accompany Spouse.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a claimant who has
left work voluntarily to accompany, follow or join his or her spouse to or in a
new locality does so without good cause for purposes of this subsection.

Discharge for Just Cause.
(b) (1) For the week in which the claimant was discharged for just
cause or for an act or omission in connection with employment, not
constituting a crime, which is deliberate, willful, or wanton and adverse to
the employer's rightful interest, if so found by the commission, and
thereafter until the claimant has earned an amount equal to at least six times
the claimant's weekly benefit amount in bona fide covered employment.

D i s c h a r g e for D i s h o n e s t y .
(b) (2) For the week in which he was discharged for dishonesty
constituting a crime or any felony or class A misdemeanor in connection
with his work as shown by the facts, together with his admission, or as
shown by his conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction of that crime
and for the 51 next following weeks and for each week thereafter until the
claimant has performed services in bona fide covered employment and
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63-46M6

STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL

(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply injudicial proceedings under thia
section.
Hiatory.C. 1953,63-46bl5, enacted by L
1987, ck 161, I 171; 1988, ch. 7 * I 2*.
Amendment Note*. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, deleted •except
that Anal agency action from informal a^judi*
cative proceedings based on a record shall be
reviewed by the district courts on the record

accordinf to the standards of Subjection
63-46M6ttr at the and la Subaection (IXa)
and made minor stylistic chanfaa.
Effective Date*. — Laws 1987, ch. 161,
{ 315 makes the act effective on January I,
193&

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Function of district court.
Section 63-46b-16(l) provides that all final
agency decisions through formal adjudicative
proceedings will be reviewed by the Utah Su*
preme Court or Court of Appeals. Therefore,

the district court will no longer function aa In*
termediate appellate court except to review in*
formal adjudicative proceedings de novo purau*
ant to Subsection (IXa) of this section. In ra
Topik, 761 ?J2d 32 (Utah Ct App. 1988).

63-46M6. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings,
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and
copies for the record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure;
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(0 the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
History: C. 1953,63-46b-16, enacted by L. appellate court" in Subsection (2Xa); and aub1987, ch. 161, I 272; 1988, ch. 72, * 2S.
ttituted "appellate rules of the appropriate apAmendment Notes. — T^e 1988 amend- pellate court" for "Utah Rules of Appellate Proment, effective April 26,1988, substituted "As cedure" in Subsection* (2Xa) and (2Kb).
provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161,
Court of Appeals" for Tht Supreme Court or f 3 1 6 m & k e a ^ a c t e f f e c t i v e o n J a n u a r y i,
other appellate court designated by statute in jp^g
Subsection (1); inserted "with the appropriate
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Function of district court.
Subsection (1) provides that all final agency
decisions through formal adjudicative proceedings will be reviewed by the Utah Supreme
Court or Court of Appeals. Therefore, the dis-

trict court will no longer function as intermediate appellate court except to review informal
adjudicative proceedingi de novo pursuant to
t 63-46b-15(lXa). In re Tapik, 761 P.2d 32
(Utah Ct App. 1988).

63-46b-17. Judicial review — Type of relief.
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudicative proceedings by the
district court or the review'of formal adjudicative proceedings by an appellate court, the court may award damages or compensation only to the
extent expressly authorized by statute.
(b) In granting relief, the court may:
(i) order agency action required by law;
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as required by law;
(iii) set aside or modify agency action;
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of agency action; or
(v) remand the matter to the agency for further proceedings.
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of final agency action are reviewable by a higher court, if authorized by statute.
History: C. 1953,63-46b~17, enacted by L. I 315 makes the act effective on January 1,
1987, ch, 161, I 271
1988.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161,
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(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court
of Appeals any of the matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, except:
(a) capita) felony convictions or sn appeal of
an interlocutory order of a court of record involving a charge of a capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers; and
(e) those matters described in Subsections
(3Xa) through (d).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in
granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari
for the review of a Court of Appeals abjudication, but
the Supreme Court shall review those cases certified
to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3Kb).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of
agency adjudicative proceedings,
ists
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78-2a-l. Creation — Seal.
There n created a court known as the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals is a court of record and
shall have a seal.
isat

78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions — Filing fees.
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges.
The term of appointment to office as a judge of the
Court of Appeals is until the first general election
held more than three years after the effective date of
the appointment. Thereafter, the term of office of a
judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and commences on the first Monday in January, next follow*
ing the date of election. A judge whose term expires
may serve, upon request of the Judicial Council, until
a successor is appointed and qualified. The presiding
judge of the Court of Appeals shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or fraction
thereof for the period served.
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judg78-2-3. Repealed.
isat
ment in panels of three judges. Assignment to panels
78-2-4. Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges shall be by random rotation of all judges of the Court
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals by rule shall propro tempore, and practice of law.
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of proce- vide for the selection of a chair for each panel. The
dure and evidence for use in the courts of the state Court of Appeals may not sit en banc
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a
and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The
Legislature may amend the rules of procedure and presiding judge from among the members of the court
evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote by majority vote of all judges. Thetermof office of the
of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the presiding judge is two years and until a successor is
elected. A presiding judge of the Court of Appeals
Legislature.
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Con- may serve in that office no more than two successive
stitution, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for
retired justices and judges and judges protemporeto an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or
perform any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall incapacity of the presiding judge.
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the
be citizens of the United States, Utah residents, and
office of presiding judge by majority vote of all judges
admitted to practice law in Utah.
(3) The Supreme Court ahall by rule govern the of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties of a
practice of law, including admission to practice law judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge
and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to shall:
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of
the practice of law.
ltst
panels;
78-2-5. Repealed.
isat
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court;
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the
78-2-6. Appellate court administrator.
Court of Appeals; and
The appellate court administrator shall appoint
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme
clerks and support staff a* necessary for the operation
Court and the Judicial Council.
of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. The
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the
duties of the clerks and support staff shall be estab- same as for the Supreme Court.
isat
lished by the appellate court administrator, and
powers established by rule of the Supreme Court.
78-2a«3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
isat
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue
78-2-7. Repealed.
isas all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary.
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders,
78-2-7.5. Service of sheriff to court
and decrees; or
The court may at any time require the attendance
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
and services of any sheriff in the state.
isat
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. Repealed.
ISM. isas including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over.
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies
CHAPTER 2a
or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, exCOURT OF APPEALS
cept the Public Service Commission, State Tax
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil,
Section
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer,
78-2a-l.
Creation — Seal.
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
78-2a-2.
Number ofjudges — Terms — Functions
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of
—- Filing fee*.
political subdivisions of the state or other lo78-2a-3.
Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
cal agencies; and
78-2a-4.
Review of actions by Supreme Court
(ii) a challenge to agency action under
78-2a-5.
Location of Court of Appeals.
Section 63-46a-12.1;
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(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except
those from the small claims department of a circuit court;
(el interlocutory appeals from any court of
record in criminal cases, except those involving a
charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal
cases, except those involving a conviction of a
first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge to
a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree
or capital felony;
(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the
Board of Pardons except in cases involving a first
degTee or capital felony;
(i) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to,
divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(j) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(JO cases transferred to the Court of Appeals
from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only
and by the vote of four judges of the court may certify
to the Supreme Court for original appellate review
and determination any matter over which the Court
of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of
agency adjudicative proceedings.
isas

Section
78-3-17.5.

76-2a-4. Review of actions by Supreme Court.
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the
Court of Appeals shall be by petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.
isat

78-3-3. Term of judges — Vacancy.
Judges of the district courts shall be appointed initially until the first general election held more than
three years after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the term of office for judges of the
district courts is six years, and commences on the
first Monday in January, next following the date of
election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is
appointed and qualified.
isss

78-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals has its principal location in
Salt Lake City. The Court of Appeals may perform
any of its functions in any location within the state.
its*

CHAPTER 3
DISTRICT COURTS
Section
78-3-1 to 78-3-2. Repealed.
Term of judges — Vacancy.
78-3-3.
Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases to cir783-4.
cuit court— Appeals — Jurisdiction
when court does not exist
Repealed.
78-3-5.
Terms — Minimum of once quarterly.
78-3-6.
78-3-7 to 78-3-11. Repealed.
State District Court Administrative
78-3-11.6.
System.
Repealed.
78-3-12.
Costs of system.
78-3-12.5.
Repealed.
78-3-13.
Counties joining court system — Pro78-3-13.4.
cedure — Facilities — Salaries.
v
78-3-13.5, 78-3-14. Repealed.,
Allocation
of
district
court fees and
78-314.5.
fines.
7A-IMS to 78-3-17. Repealed.

78-3-18.
78-3-19.
78-3-20.
78-3-21.
78-3-22.
78-3-23.
78-3*24.
78-3-25.
78-3-26.
78-3-27.
78-3-28.
78-3-29.
76-3-30.
78-3-31.

Application of savings accruing to
counties.
Judicial Administration Act — Short
title.
Purpose of act.
Definitions.
Judicial Council — Creation — Members — Terms and election — Responsibilities — Reports.
Presiding officer — Compensation —
Duties.
Administrator of the courts — Appointment — Qualifications — Salary.
Court administrator — Powers, duties, and responsibilities.
Assistants for administrator of the
courts — Appointment of trial court
executives.
Courts to provide information and statistical data to administrator of the
courts.
Annual judicial conference.
Repealed.
Presiding judge — Election — Term
— Compensation — Powers — Duties.
Duties of the clerk of the district
court.
Court commissioners — Qualifications
— Appointment — Functions governed by rule.

784-1 to 78-3-2. Repealed.

1971. 1SS1, IMS

78-3-4. Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases to circuit court — Appeals — Jurisdiction
when court does not exist
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all
matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah
Constitution and not prohibited by law.
(2) The district court judges may issue all extraordinary writs and other writs necessary to carry into
effect their orders, judgments, and decrees.
(3) Under the general supervision of the presiding
officer of the Judicial Council and subject to policies
established by the Judicial Council, cases filed in the
district court, which are also within the concurrent
jurisdiction of the circuit court, may be transferred to
the circuit court by the presiding judge of the district
court in multiple judge districts or the district court
judge in single judge districts. The transfer of these
cases may be made upon the courts own motion or
upon the motion of either party for adjudication.
When an order is made transferring a case, the court
shall transmit the pleadings and papers to the circuit
court to which the case is transferred. The circuit
court has the same jurisdiction as if the case had been
originally commenced in the circuit court and any
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R562-5b-102
same sex. For sexual harassment to be discriminatory,
R562-5b. Discharge and Discharge for
the following three elements must be shown to exist
Crime.
(1) Unwanted conduct or communication of a sexual
nature which adverse)y affects a person'* employment
relationship or working environment, if:
(a) submission to the conduct is either an explicit or
implicit term or condition of employment, or
(b) submission to or rejection of the conduct is used as
a basis for an employment decision affecting the person, or
(c) the conduct haa a purpose or effect of substantially
interfering with a person's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment,
(2) Unsolicited, deliberately sexual statements, gestures or physical contacts which are objectionable to the
recipient,
(3) Undermines the integrity of the workplace,
destroys morale and offends legal and social standards
of acceptable behavior.
b. Inappropriate behavior which has sexual connotation but does not meet the test of sexual discrimination
is insufficient to establish good cause for leaving work.
11. Discrimination
It is also a violation of Federal law to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of the individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or to limit, segregate, or classify
employees in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive an individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee
because of the individual's race, color, religion, sex or
national origin.
R562-5a-& Effective Date of Disqualification.
1. The disqualification under this section technically
begins with the week the claimant voluntarily quit the
job. However, to avoid the confusion which arises when
a disqualification is made for a period of time prior to
the filing of a claim, the claimant will be notified that
benefits are denied beginning with the effective date of
a new or reopened claim. The disqualification continues
until the claimant returns to work in a bona fide covered employment and earns six times his weekly benefit amount alter the week in which the claimant left
work. A disqualification which begins in one benefit
year will continue into a new benefit year unless purged
by subsequent earnings,
2. If an individual is receiving remuneration which is
attributed to a period of time following the last day of
work, such as severance or vacation pay, the "week in
which the claimant left work" is considered to be the
last week for which such remuneration was attributable as an individual is not •unemployed"' while receiving remuneration from an employer, and such
severance or vacation pay cannot be used to purge a disqualification.
KEY: unemployment eompcnmtSoo, employment, «Bploy*#*i
ritfhU, employ** Urminmtiom*
ISSt

SM-SXa)

R562-5b-101. Discharge General Definition.
R562-5b-102. Just Cause.
R562-5b-103. Burden of Proof.
R562-6b-104. Quit or Discharge.
R562-5b-105. Disciplinary Suspension or Involuntary
Furlough.
R562-5b~i06. Proximal Cause - Relation of Offenses to
Discharge.
R562-5b-107. In Connection with Employment
R562-6V108. Examples of Reasons for Discharge.
R562-5b-10$. Effective Date of Disqualification.
R562-5b-201. Discharge for Crime-General Definition.
R562-5b-202. In Connection with Work.
R562-5b-203. Dishonesty or Other Disqualifying
Crimea.
R562-5b-204. Admission or Conviction in a Court
R562-5b-205. Benefit* Held in Abeyance,
R562-5b-206. Disqualification Period.
R562-5b-10I. Discharge General Definition.
Ordinarily accepted concepts of justice are used in
determining if a discharge is disqualifying under the
"juBt cause" provisions of the Act Just cause is defined
as a job separation that is necessary due to the seriousness of actual or potential harm to the employer provided the claimant had knowledge of the employers
expectations and had control over the circumstances
which led to the discharge. Just cause is not established
if the reason for the discharge is baseless, arbitrary or
capricious or the employer has failed to uniformly apply
reasonable standards to all employees when instituting
disciplinary action. The purpose of this section is to
deny benefits to individuals who bring about their own
unemployment by conducting themselves, with respect
to their employment with callousness, misbehavior, or
lack of consideration to such a degree that the employer
was justified in discharging the employee. However,
when an employee is discharged by his employer, such
discharge may have been the result of incompetence,
lack of skill, or other reasons which are beyond the
claimants control. The question which must be established by the evidence is whether the claimant is at
fault in his resulting unemployment Unemployment
insurance benefits will be denied if the employer had
just cause for discharging the employee. However, not
every cause for discharge provides a basis to deny benefits. In order to have just cause for discharge pursuant
to Section 36-4- SXbXl) there must be some fault on the
part of the employee involved.
R562-6b-102. Just Cause.
1. The basic factors which establish just cause, and
are essential for a determination of ineligibility art:
a. Culpability
This is the seriousness of the conduct or the severity
of the offense as H affects continuance of the employment relationship. The discharge must have been necessary to avoid actual or potential harm to the
employers rightful interests. A discharge would not be
considered "necessary" if it is not consistent with reasonable employment practices. The wrongness of the
conduct must be considered in the context of the particular employment and how it affects the employer's
rights. If the conduct was an isolated incident of poor
judgment and there is no expectation that the conduct
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will be continued or repeated, potential harm may not
be shown and therefore it ia not neceaaary to discharge
the employee.
(1) Longevity and prior work record are important in
determining if the act or omisaion ia an isolated incident or a good faith error in judgment An employee
who has historically complied with work rules does not
demonstrate by a single violation, even though harmful, that such violations will be repeated and therefore
require discharge to avoid future harm to the employer.
For example: A long term employee who does not have
a history of tardiness or absenteeism is absent without
leave for a number of days due to a death in his immediate family Although this is a violation of the employera rules and may establish just cause for discharging
a new employee, the fact that the employee has established over a long period of time that he complies with
attendance rules shows that the circumstance is mora
of an isolated incident rather than a violation of the
rules that is or could be expected to be habitual. In this
case because the potential for harm to the employer ia
not shown, it is not necessary for the employer to discharge the employee, and therefore just cause is not
established
b Knowledge
The employee must have had a knowledge of the conduct which the employer expected. It ia not necessary
that the claimant intended to cause harm to the
employer, but he should reasonably have been able to
anticipate the effect his conduct would have Knowledge may not be established unless the employer gave
a dear explanation of the expected behavior or had a
pertinent written policy, except in the case of a flagrant
violation of a universal standard of behavior If the
employer's expectations are unclear, ambiguous or
inconsistent, the existence of knowledge is not shown
A specific warning is one way of showing that the
employee had knowledge of the expected conduct After
the employee is given a warning he should be given an
opportunity to correct objectionable conduct Additional
violations occurring after the warning would be necessary to establish just cause for a discharge.
(1) For Example When the employer has an established procedure of progressive discipline, auch procedures generally must have been followed in order to
establish that the employee had knowledge of the
expected behavior or the seriousness of the act The
exception ia that very severe conduct, auch as criminal
actions, may justify immediate discharge without following a progressive disciplinary program
c Control
The conduct must have been within the power and
capacity of the claimant to control or prevent
2 Just cause may not be established when the reason
for discharge is based on such things as mere mistakes,
inefficiency, failure of performance as the result of
inability or incapacity, inadvertence in isolated
instances, good faith errors in judgment or in the exercise of discretion, minor but casual or unintentional
carelessness or negligence, etc These examples of conduct are not disqualifying because of the lack of knowledge or control. However, continued inefficiency,
repeated carelessness, or lack of care exercised by ordinary, reasonable workers in similar circumstances,
may be disqualifying depending on the reason and
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degree of the carelessness, the knowledge and control of
the employe*.
3. The term *5ust cause" as used in Section 5(bXl)
does not lesaen the requirement that there be some
fault on the part of the employee involved. Prior to the
1983 addition of the term "just cause" the Commiaaion
interpreted Section 6(bXl) to require an intentional
infliction of harm or intentional disregard of the
employer's interests. The intent of the Legislature in
adding the worda "5uat cause* to Section 5<bXl) was
apparently to correct this restrictive interpretation.
While some fault must be present, it ia sufficient that
the acta were intended, the consequences were reasonably foreseeable, and that such acta have serious effect
on the employee's job or the employer's interests.
R£62-5b-10a. Burden of Proof.
1. In a discharge, the employer initiates the separation and, as such, ia the primary source of information
with regard to the reasons for the dismissal. The
employer has the burden of proof which is the responsibility to establish the facta resulting in the discharge.
The employer is required by the Statute in Section 354-11(g) to keep accurate records and to provide correct
information to the Department for proper administration of the Act Although the employer has the burden
to establish just cause for the discharge, if sufficient
facts are obtained from the claimant, a decision will be
made based on the information available. The failure of
one party to provide information does not necessarily
result in a ruling favorable to the other party.
2 All interested parties have the right to give rebuttal
to information contrary to the interests of that party.
R562-6b-104. Quit or Discharge.
The determination of whether a separation is a quit
or a discharge is made by the Department baaed on the
circumstances which resulted in the separation. The
conclusions on the employer's records, the separation
notice or the claimant's report are not controlling on the
Department
1 Discharge Before Effective Date of Resignation
a Discharge
When an individual notifies an employer that he
intends to leave aa of a definite date in the future and
ia discharged prior to that date, the cause for the separation on the day the separation takes place ia the controlling factor in determining whether it waa a quit or
discharge Although the separation might have been
motivated by the claimants announced resignation, the
employer was the moving party in ending the employment prior to the resignation date. Therefore, the
immediate reason was more closely related to the
employer'a action than to the daimanfa announced
intention to quit Unless disqualifying conduct ia
involved, the separation ia conaidered to be for the convenience of the employer. If the employer does not pay
regular wagea through the period of the notice but
merely pays vacation pay which was not previously
assigned to the period of the notice, the separation la
still the result of a discharge which occurs prior to the
date the worker planned to quit The assignment of
vacation pay to the period of time between the notice of
intended resignation and the last date the employee
planned work does not change the character of the aep-
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aration.
b Quit
If an employee announce* a future date of resignation
and is relieved of work responsibilities but ia paid regular wages through the date of his announced resignation, it is not a discharge, but a quit
2 Leaving in Anticipation of Discharge
When an employee leaves work in anticipation of a
possible discharge or layoff, and if the reason for the
discharge would not be disqualifying, the separation ia
generally considered to be a voluntary quit However,
an individual who leaves work to avoid virtually certain
discharge for disqualifying conduct cannot thereby
avoid the disqualifying provisions of Section 36-4 -5(b),
and the separation ia considered a discharge rather
than voluntary leaving.
3. Employee Knows His Action will Result in Discharge
Absence taken without permission, or other actions
contrary to specific reasonable instructions from the
employer, are generally considered a voluntary separation rather than discharge, if the worker was given a
choice of complying or being separated.
R562-5b-105. D i s c i p l i n a r y S u s p e n s i o n o r
Involuntary Furlough.
When an employee is put on a disciplinary suspension
or involuntary furlough, he may meet the definition of
"unemployed." If the claimant files during the suspension or furlough, the reason for the suspension or furlough must be adjudicated as a discharge, even though
the claimant is still attached to the employer and
expects to return to work. A suspension which waa reasonable and necessary to prevent potential harm to the
employer or to maintain necessary discipline would
generally result in a disqualification under this section
provided the elements of control and knowledge are
present Failure to return to work at the end of the definite period of suspension or furlough would be considered a voluntary quit and eligibility would then be
determined consistent with Section 35-4-6U), if the
claimant had not been previously denied.
R662-5b-106. Proximal Cause - R e l a t i o n of
Offenses to Discharge.
1. The cause for discharge is that conduct which motivates the employer to make the decision to terminate
the employee's services. If the decision has truly been
made, it is generally demonstrated by way of notice to
the employee or the initiation of a personnel action.
Although the employer may learn of other ofTensea following the making of the decision to terminate, the reason for the discharge is limited to that conduct of which
the employer was aware prior to making the decision.
However, if the employer dischargee a person because
of some preliminary evidence of certain conduct, but
does not obtain all of the proof of the conduct until after
the separation notice is given, it could still be concluded
that the discharge was caused by that conduct which
the employer was investigating. Eligibility for benefits
will then be determined by considering the extent of
culpability, knowledge and control
2. When the discharge does not occur immediately
after the employer becomes aware of an offense, a presumption arises that there were other reasons for the
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discharge. This relationship between the offense and
the discharge must be established both as to cause and
time. The presumption that the conduct was not the
cause of the discharge may be overcome by a showing
that the delay was due to such things as investigation
arbitration, or hearings conducted with regard to the
employee's conduct When a grievance or arbitration ia
pending with respect to the discharge, the Department's decision will be baaed on the information available to the Department The Department's decision ia
not binding on the grievance resolution process or an
arbitrator and the decision of the arbitrator ia not binding On the Department When an employer ia faced
with the necessity of a reduction in his workforce but
uses an employee's prior conduct as the criteria for
determining who will be laid ofT, the lack of work is the
primary motivation or cause of the discharge, not the
conduct
R562-5b-107. In Connection with Employment
Disqualifying conduct is not limited to offenses which
take place on the employers premises or during business hours. It is only necessary that the conduct have
Buch "connection" to the employee's duties and to the
employer's business that it is a subject of legitimate and
significant concern to the employer. All employers, both
public and private have the right to expect employees to
refrain from acts which are detrimental to the business
or would bring dishonor on the business name or the
institution. Legitimate interests of employers include,
but are not limited to: goodwill of customers, reputation
of the business, efficiency, business costs, morale of
employees, discipline, honesty, trust and loyalty.
R562«6b-10& Examples of Reasons for Discharge.
In all the following examples, the basic elements of
just cause must be considered in determining eligibility
for benefits. The following examples do not include all
reasons for discharge.
I. Violation of Company Rules
If an employee violates reasonable rules of the
employer and the three elements of culpability, knowledge and control are established, benefits must be
denied.
a. "Hie reasonableness of the employer's rules will
depend on the necessity for such a rule as it aflects the
employer's interests. Rules which are contrary to genera] public policy or which infringe upon the recognized
rights and privileges of individuals may not be reasonable. An employer must have broader prerogatives in
regulating conduct when employees are on the job than
when they are not An employer must be able to make
rules for employee on-the-job conduct that reasonably
further the legitimate business interests of the
employer. An employer is not required to impose only
minimum standards, but there may be some justifiable
cause for violations of rules that are unreasonable or
unduly harsh, rigorous or exacting. When rules are
changed, adequate notice and reasonable opportunity
to comply must be afforded. If the employee believes a
rule is unreasonable, he has the responsibility to discuss his concerns with the employer and give the
employer an opportunity to take corrective action.
b. Discharges may be regulated by an employment
contract or collective bargaining agreement Just cause
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for the discharge is not established if the employee's
conduct was consistent with his rights under such contract or the discharge was contrary to the provisions of
such contract.
c. Habitual offenses may not be disqualifying conduct
if it ifi found that the act was condoned by the employer
or was so prevalent as to be customary. However, when
the worker is given notice that the conduct will no
longer be tolerated, further violations could result in a
denial of benefits.
d. Culpability may be established even if the result of
the violation of the rule does not in and of itself cause
harm to the employer, but the resultant lack of compliance with rules diminishes the employer's ability to
have order and control. Culpability is established if termination of the employee was required to maintain necessary discipline in the company.
e. Knowledge of the employer's standards of behavior
is usually provided in the form of verbal instructions,
written rules and/or warnings. However, the warning is
not always necessary for a disqualification to apply in
cases of violations of a serious nature of universal standards of conduct of which the claimant should have
been aware without being warned.
2. Attendance Violations
a. It is the duty of the worker to be punctual and
remain at work within the reasonable requirements of
the employer. Discharge for unjustified absence or tardiness is considered disqualifying if the worker knows
that he is violating attendance rules. Such violations
are generally a serious matter of concern to employers
as attendance standards are necessary to maintain
order, control, and productivity. Discharge for an attendance violation beyond the control of the worker ia not
disqualifying unless the worker reasonably could have
given notice or obtained permission consistent with the
employer's rules.
b. In cases of termination for violations of attendance
atandards, the employee's recent hiatory of attendance
shall be considered to determine if the violation is an
isolated incident, or demonstrates a pattern of unjustified absences within the control of the employee. Flagrant misuse of attendance privileges may result in a
denial of benefits even if the last incident was beyond
the employee's control.
3. Falsification of Work Record
a. The duty of honesty is inherent in any employee/
employer relationship. A statement made in an application for a job may be considered as connected with the
work, even though it is made before the work begins. An
individual begins his obligations as an employee when
he makes an application for work. One of those obligations is to give the employer truthful answers to all
material questions. Any falsification of information
which may operate to expose the employer to possible
loss, litigation, or damage would be considered material
and therefore may establish culpability. If the claimant
made a false statement while applying for work in order
to be hired, benefits may be denied even if the claimant
would have otherwise remained unemployed and eligible for the receipt of unemployment benefits depending
upon the degree of knowledge, culpability and control
4. Insubordination
Authority is required in the work place to maintain
order and efficiency. An employer has the right to
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expect that lines of authority will be maintained; that
reasonable orders, given in a civil manner, will be
obeyed; that supervisors will be respected and that
their authority will not be undermined. In determining
when insubordination (resistance to authority)
becomes disqualifying conduct, ths fact that there was
a disregard of the employer's interests is the major
importance. Mere protests or dissatisfaction without an
overt act is not in disregard of the employer's interests.
However, provocative remarks to a superior or vulgar
or profane language in response to a civil request may
be insubordination if it is conducive to disruption of
routine, negation of authority and impairment of efficiency. Mere incompatibility or emphatic insistence or
discussion by an employee who was acting in good faith
is not disqualifying conduct.
6. Loss of License
When an employee loses a license which he knows is
required for the performance of the job, and the individual had control over the circumstances which resulted
in the loss of the license, such conduct is disqualifying.
For example, if the claimant worked as a driver, and
lost his license because of a conviction for driving under
the influence (DUD, culpability is established if he fails
to obtain a permit to drive at work or the conviction
would expose the employer to additional liabilities. The
employer cannot authorize an employee to drive in violation of the law. Also, additional insurance costs or
other liabilities are a legitimate concern of the
employer. Knowledge is established because it is a matter of common knowledge in the State of Utah that driving under the influence of alcohol is a violation of the
law and is punishable by loss of the individual's driving
privileges. Judicial notice can be taken of this fact
because a question relative to this matter is on every
driver's license test. He had control in that he made a
conscious decision to risk loss of the license when he
failed to make arrangements for transportation prior to
becoming under the influence of intoxicants,
R562-£b-109. Effective Date of Disqualification.
The Act provides that any disqualification under this
section will include "the week in which the claimant
was discharged . . ." However, to avoid confusion, the
denial of benefits will begin with the Sunday of the
week for which claimant has filed for benefits.
R562-5b-201. D i s c h a r g e for C r i m e - G e n e r a l
Definition.
1. A crime is a punishable act in violation of law; an
offense against the State or the United States. "Crime"
and "Misdemeanor* are synonymous terms; though in
common usage crime is used to denote offenses of a
more serious nature. However, for example: an insignificant, although illegal act, or the taking or destruction
of something which is of little or no value, or believed to
have been abandoned may not be sufficient to establish
that a crime was committed as defined for the application of this section of the Act, even if the claimant was
found guilty of a violation of the law.
2. The duties of honesty and responsible behavior are
implied in any employment relationship. A worker is
obligated to deal with his employer responsibly in
truthfulness and good faith. The penalties imposed by
this Section (a 52 week disqualification and subsequent
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UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Rule 14

TITLE III.
REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF ORDERS OF
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES, COMMISSIONS, AND COMMITTEES.
Rule 14. Review of administrative orders: how obtained;
intervention.
(a) Petition for review of order; joint petition. When judicial review by
the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals is provided by statute of an order
or decision of an administrative agency, board, commission, committee, or
officer (hereinafter the term "agency" shall include agency, board, commission, committee, or officer), a petition for review shall be filed with the clerk of
the appellate court within the time prescribed by statute, or if there is no time
prescribed, then within 30 days after the date of the written decision or order.
The term petition for review* includes a petition to eryoin, set aside, suspend,
modify, or otherwise review a notice of appeal or a writ of certiorari. The
petition shall specify the parties seeking review and shall designate the respondents) and the order or decision, or part thereof, to be reviewed. In each
case, the agency shall be named respondent. The State of Utah shall be
deemed a respondent if so required by statute, even though not so designated
in the petition. If two or more persons are entitled to petition for review of the
&ame order and their interests are such as to make joinder practicable, they
may file a joint petition for review and may thereafter proceed as a single
petitioner.
(b) Statutory and docketing fees. At the time of filing any petition for
review, the party obtaining the review shall pay to the clerk of the appellate
court such filing fees as are established by law, and also the fee for docketing
the appeal. The clerk shall not accept a petition for review unless the filing
and docketing fees are paid.
(c) Service of petition. A copy of the petition for review shall be served by
the petitioner on the named respondent(s), upon all other parties to the proceeding before the agency, and upon the Attorney General of Utah, if the state
is a party, in the manner prescribed by Rule 3(e). The petitioner, at the time of
filing the petition for review, shall also file with the clerk of the appellate
court a certificate reflecting service upon all parties to the agency proceeding
who have been served.
(d) Intervention. Any person who seeks to intervene in a proceeding under
this rule shall serve upon all parties to the proceeding and upon all parties
who participated before the agency, and file with the clerk of the appellate
court a motion for leave to intervene. The motion shall contain a concise
statement of the interest of the moving party and the grounds upon which
intervention is sought. A motion for leave to intervene shall be filed within 40
days of the date on which the petition for review is filed.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
J

I hereby certify that, on the

day of February,

1993, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, eight (8) true
and correct copies of STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS AT
ISSUE to:

Court Clerk
Utah Court of Appeals
230 South 500 East, #400
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
and two (2) copies to the following:
Gayle M. Fullerton
7669 South Sunrise Place
West Jordan, UT 84084
Jan Graham
Attorney General of Utah
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Emma R. Thomas
Special Assistant Attorney General
140 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Winston M. Faux, Esq.
Attorney for Respondent, Board of Review
The Industrial Commission of Utah
Department of Employment Security
140 East 300 South
P.O. Box 11600
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0600
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